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Notions of Solidarity and Integration in Times of War:  
The Idea of Europe, 1914-1918 
 
This article argues that Europe remained present during some of the Continent’s 
darkest years in recent history. Arguably, the First World War did not just aggravate 
nationalist sentiments and xenophobic tendencies but also encouraged intercultural 
exchange and a better understanding of other societies and ways of life. Indeed, the 
wartime prevalence of notions of solidarity and integration requires more attention and 
careful analysis. The essay explores three key issues, focusing in particular on 
solidarity practices and transnational interaction. It investigates military alliances, the 
collaboration between national independence movements, and the role of neutral 
countries as refuge and gathering place of pacifist groups and intellectuals. Many of 
these actors discussed and promoted forms of at least regional cooperation in post-war 
Europe. 
 
Keywords: Solidarity, European history, First World War, internationalism, military 




Writing shortly before the end of the First World War, the Czech philosopher and statesman Tomáš 
G. Masaryk expressed his conviction that the conflict and its consequences ‘brought mankind 
closer together’: ‘Internationalism, more intimate than ever, has been fostered by this war’.1 Given 
the destruction and suffering caused by more than four years of industrialised warfare and 
economic hardship, such a statement will surprise many and seem hardly credible. Scholars have, 
quite understandably, tended to focus on the nationalism and hatred in the belligerent countries, 
holding that it led to a fundamental rupture of any sense of European solidarity and unity. While 
this is true for broad sections of public (and private) opinion, there was a considerable number of 
dissenting Europeanist voices which have been largely ignored by academic research. Indeed, most 
historians of the idea of Europe cover the period of the First World War only briefly, and Jean-
Baptiste Duroselle even stated that ‘there was no Europe between 1914 and 1919’.2 But the war 
did not cut off all international links and in fact created many new ties of friendship and support. 
This article demonstrates these points by exploring three main topics, focusing on practices of 
solidarity, transnational interaction and coordination, and plans for future cooperation, rather than 
on the actual use of the term ‘solidarity’ by contemporaries. In a first step, it will examine the 
arguably most obvious but nevertheless widely overlooked bond of solidarity and community 
during the war, namely military alliances. The essay will then discuss the shared aspirations and 
joint activities of East-Central European independence movements, before considering the role of 
neutral countries, pacifist groups, and émigré intellectuals in preserving and promoting a spirit of 
continental unity and peace. 
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The Breakdown of Pre-War Internationalism 
The period before the outbreak of the First World War is often described as an age of Great Power 
rivalry and imperial competition, leading to a marked deterioration of European affairs since at 
least 1890. The emergence of an antagonistic alliance system and a series of diplomatic crises over 
North Africa and the Balkans, the increasing militarisation of many societies, and the rise of 
popular nationalist movements all seem to indicate an almost inevitable path towards a major 
international conflict.3 Such conventional views have more recently been challenged by a number 
of historians, who have pointed to counter-tendencies and various efforts aiming at rapprochement 
and mutual understanding, such as the two international peace conferences in The Hague 
(1899/1907), the Anglo-German détente prior to 1914, or the rise of pacifist movements at the turn 
of the century.4 Other scholars have highlighted the internationalisation of European societies as a 
consequence of certain technological innovations and the growth of a more mobile and well-
informed middle class.5 Despite some setbacks and slumps, and the persistence or revival of trade 
protectionism, European economies became more interlinked than ever before. These trends often 
had a marked global dimension, but still applied primarily to the Continent, as evidenced by the 
various trade fairs or transnational networks of businessmen, academics, and intellectuals. Charles 
Emmerson, for instance, has described the pre-war years as ‘a period of unprecedented 
globalisation, rich in encounters, interconnections and ideas’, but also underlined that Europe was 
‘the engine room of these developments.’6 While those years were characterised by a notable lack 
of European idealism and proposals for continental integration, especially when compared to the 
first half of the nineteenth century or the interwar period, there were a number of projects and 
institutions more limited in scope and purpose, such as the European Danube Commission (1856), 
the International Telegraph Union (1865), the Universal Postal Union (1874), or the Central 
Office for International Railway Transport (1893). It was against this background of increased 
economic and financial interdependence that the British journalist Norman Angell held war 
unprofitable and disastrous.7 All this went hand in hand with strong self-confidence, a belief in 
European superiority and the right (if not duty) to civilise non-European territories and peoples. In 
his autobiography The World of Yesterday (1942), the Austrian writer Stefan Zweig later described 
the emergence of a ‘European community spirit’ and ‘European national consciousness’ in the pre-
war period: ‘Never had Europe been stronger, richer, more beautiful, or more confident of an even 
better future.’8 The picture Zweig painted was of course a glorifying and nostalgic one, expressing 
the longing for a seemingly peaceful, prosperous, and tolerant past that had vanished forever. It is 
indeed important not to generalise and overstate the degree of internationalisation and contact, 
given the major regional and socio-economic differences within Europe. On the other hand, there 
was a widespread awareness that the outbreak of the war in summer 1914 represented a 
fundamental rupture in European relations, cutting those ties of friendship, cooperation, and trust 
between individuals and communities. This also applied to three of the most prominent roots or 
circles of international solidarity in pre-war Europe: long-standing dynastic links and interests, 
shared religious beliefs and practices, and the camaraderie and collective class consciousness of 
organised labour. Already in decline since the second half of the nineteenth century and regardless 
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of close family ties between Europe’s royal houses, the concept of monarchical solidarity, i.e. of 
jointly embodying and defending the principles of legitimate rule, political integrity, and historical 
continuity, proved empty in 1914.9 In spite of the central doctrines of universal Christian unity and 
brotherhood, and various ecumenical initiatives in the pre-war period, such as the World Student 
Christian Federation (1895) and The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship 
through the Churches (1914), most religious groups and institutions quickly rallied behind the 
cause of the fatherland. They contributed significantly to the spiritual mobilisation of state and 
society by justifying the war as just and calling for individual and collective sacrifices in the name 
of God and the nation. As the German court chaplain Ernst Dryander preached on 4 August 1914: 
‘God will be with our just weapons! For German faith and German piety are intimately bound up 
with German civilisation.’10 Despite large anti-war demonstrations in numerous European cities, 
involving 750,000 people in Germany alone, the international solidarity of the working class broke 
down upon the outbreak of war, too, as most labour activists bought into the notion of a defensive 
war and thus supported the national war effort. Following London’s entry into the war, Fenner 
Brockway, the editor of the newspaper of the Independent Labour Party, was one of the few voices 
left who argued that British workers had ‘no quarrel’ with the workers in other countries: ‘The 
quarrel is between the ruling classes of Europe. Don’t make this quarrel yours’.11 As we will see 
in the following, while the beginning of hostilities did bring an end to many established forms of 
European cooperation and dialogue, new ideals and practices of cross-border interaction emerged 
relatively quickly. 
 
Brothers in Arms: Military Alliances and Plans for European Integration 
Most of the European great powers were multi-ethnic entities, and – apart from the Habsburg 
Monarchy – as imperial domains that stretched across continents, they quickly turned the military 
conflict into a global affair. This alone should warn us against studying the war in purely European 
terms and against overemphasising elements of national (or nation-state) antagonism and 
isolation.12 Moreover, while military conflicts undoubtedly foster feelings of enmity and hatred, 
they can also encourage intercultural understanding and interaction, especially amongst military 
allies and international partners. The First World War was, above all, a war of coalitions, and even 
though it often proved difficult to establish a unified alliance strategy under joint leadership given 
the differences in operational aims, manpower, equipment, training, and morale, the fundamental 
principle of solidarity and mutual support remained significant and often decisive.13 During the 
war, Germany found itself allied not only to its Zweibund partner, Austria-Hungary, but also to the 
Ottoman Empire (since October 1914), a Muslim realm which had repeatedly posed an existential 
threat to European Christianity and independence, and to Bulgaria (since September 1915), a Slav 
country with Russophile sentiments. Nevertheless, many German politicians and intellectuals 
celebrated the war alliance with Constantinople and Sofia as an organic union, ‘a natural coalition’ 
of younger, unspoilt and authentic nations fighting for the defence of European culture and 
civilisation against Russian ‘barbarism’ and the materialism and decadence of the Western 
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democracies.14 While the Bulgarians were now portrayed as westward-looking ‘Prussians of the 
Balkans’, some authors declared their solidarity with oppressed Muslims under the rule of the 
Entente powers and supported German-Ottoman efforts to incite a religious war (jihad).15 Many 
commentators were also well aware of the Habsburg ally’s multinational character and recognised 
the war effort of the Austro-Slavs and the Magyars.16 From early on, Germany assumed a role as 
protector and liberator of non-Russian nationalities in the western territories of the Tsarist Empire, 
and pursued various other initiatives to revolutionise the enemies’ colonial areas and to undermine 
the imperial fabric there, including attempts to offer military aid to Irish nationalists. The most 
successful of these efforts was the transport of Lenin in a sealed train from his exile in Switzerland 
to Petrograd in April 1917, thus unleashing the ‘most grisly of all weapons’, as Winston Churchill 
later recalled.17  
There were similar endeavours on the side of the Entente with regard to Arab tribes in the 
Ottoman Empire and some East-Central European peoples under Habsburg rule, a point discussed 
in greater detail below. One of the key arguments for London’s involvement in the war had been 
the defence of Belgian independence, and the Western powers quickly presented themselves as 
guardians of European civilisation, freedom, and democracy against Prusso-German militarism 
and autocracy. As Prime Minister Herbert Asquith declared on 6 August 1914, Britain was entering 
the war in order to defend the rights and independence of small nationalities: ‘I do not believe any 
nation ever entered into a great controversy … with a clearer conscience and a stronger conviction 
that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but 
that it is fighting in defence of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of 
the world.’18 Up to 250,000 Belgians found refuge in allied Britain, with an even higher number 
settling in France (while the rest of the total number of c. 600,000 refugees went to the 
Netherlands).19 Entente politicians and publicists also celebrated their coalition, although Russia 
seems to have been mentioned less often. Some French and Italian intellectuals glorified the 
brotherhood between Latin belligerent countries by employing a peculiar mixture of national(ist) 
and transnational arguments that was also characteristic for other Pan-nationalist movements.20 It 
was, however, the Franco-British relationship that stood at the centre of the discourse of 
comradeship and solidarity amongst the Entente allies, at least up to the US-American entry into 
the war in early 1917. In a series of articles published in the Daily Telegraph in September 1915, 
Rudyard Kipling, the popular writer and ardent defender of British imperialism who was now 
working for the War Propaganda Bureau at Wellington House, praised the French for fighting ‘on 
the frontier of civilisation’ against those German ‘brutes yonder’: ‘It is the rampart put up by Man 
against the Beast, precisely as in the Stone Age.’ He showed himself impressed by ‘that iron nerve 
and endurance and faith which is the new inheritance of France’ and argued that ‘there is only one 
world today, the world of the Allies’: ‘Each of them knows what the others are doing and – the 
rest doesn’t matter. This is a curious but delightful fact to realise at first hand. And think what it 
will be later, when we shall all circulate among each other and open our hearts and talk it over in 
a brotherhood more intimate than the ties of blood!’.21  
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It was against this background of coalition warfare and alliance rhetoric that schemes for more 
permanent political and economic cooperation were put forward by politicians and publicists, such 
as the idea of a Central European economic association, commonly known as Mitteleuropa.22 
Friedrich Naumann, for instance, who was one of the foremost advocates of the project in 
Germany, portrayed his plan as the continuation or consequence of the wartime solidarity and 
comradeship-in-arms between the Central Powers: ‘We fight as Germans, but we fight with 
millions of non-Germans, who are prepared to go with us to battle and to death, so long as they 
have our respect and can believe that our victory will also be their victory.’23 We can find similar, 
though less far-reaching ideas of economic integration and continental solidification amongst the 
allied democracies, in particular in France. This was partly a reaction to the German scheme and 
intended to guarantee self-sufficiency and closer cooperation also after the war, but the proposition 
to perpetuate economic warfare beyond the end of hostilities met resistance in London, Rome, and 
St Petersburg. Still, it re-emerged in more concrete forms in summer 1918, and David Stevenson 
is right in pointing out that ‘a project for a Western European union appears first to have circulated 
in the Paris bureaucracy not in 1929-30 or 1950 but in 1918.’24 
 
The ‘New Europe’: National Independence Movements in East-Central Europe 
‘Everywhere the weak, oppressed, and exploited unite themselves – association is the watchword 
of our era: federation, the free federation of small nations and states will be the consummation of 
this principle securing the final organization of the whole of mankind.’25 This is how Masaryk 
described the wartime cooperation between various separatist movements in Central and Eastern 
Europe, aimed against (and transcending the borders of) the Russian and Habsburg Empires. It 
markedly went beyond pre-war contacts between activists in the region who had long demanded 
enhanced autonomy within the imperial framework rather than full national independence.26 But 
the protracted duration of the war, the scale of casualties and material hardship, and increased 
political repression led to a radicalisation of demands, as shown for instance at the re-opening of 
the Austrian Reichsrat in May 1917.27 Encouraged by the military successes of the Central Powers 
in Eastern Europe and domestic problems within the Tsarist Empire, non-Russian nationalities 
were equally hoping for political liberation from ‘foreign rule’. Exile activists, who promoted their 
national cause abroad, were crucial for these efforts. While some Poles such as Józef Piłsudski 
sought the support of Berlin and Vienna for the re-unification of Poland, Roman Dmowski and 
others sided with the Entente, setting up the Polish National Committee and liaising with a number 
of other pro-independence émigrés from the Habsburg Monarchy, including Ante Trumbić and 
Frano Supilo from the Yugoslav Committee or Masaryk and Edvard Beneš from the Czechoslovak 
National Council. In April 1918, they famously met at the Rome Congress of Oppressed 
Nationalities and passed a joint declaration, calling for the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and 
national self-determination. Having quickly gained the support of influential publicists in France 
and the United Kingdom (such as Robert William Seton-Watson), by summer 1918 the exile 
politicians received official recognition as de-facto governments of their respective homelands.28 
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Woodrow Wilson, too, who had initially envisaged greater national equality within the existing 
state entities (although his Fourteen Points of January 1918 already demanded an independent 
Poland), eventually backed national independence and a territorial reconfiguration of Central and 
Eastern Europe.29 However, there were also several concepts for long-term regional integration 
beyond this wartime cooperation. The Corfu Declaration of July 1917 envisaged a united Southern 
Slav Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Taking up federalist ideas of the pre-war period and 
often referring back to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Polish intellectuals and politicians 
such as Leon Wasilewski promoted an East-Central European union, comprising Polish, 
Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian territories.30 Following earlier Czech-Polish discussions 
and embracing Wilsonian ideals, the Mid-European Union was established in Philadelphia in 
October 1918, a loose (and short-lived) political association that was supported by a number of 
national representatives (including Romanians, Greeks, and Italians). Integration plans were 
repeatedly debated at the meetings, but the scope and form of future cooperation remained 
contested. Ultimately, the delegates pronounced in rather vague terms that ‘our peoples, having 
kindred ideals and purposes, should coordinate their efforts to insure the liberties of their individual 
nations for the furtherance of their common welfare’.31 Masaryk, who was one of the signatories 
of the document, had long promoted similar ideas in his publications. His New Europe (1918) 
envisaged a political reorganisation of the area between Germany and Russia to counter Prussian 
militarism and Habsburg absolutism: a liberal-democratic association of free and equal nations, 
although he remained sceptical about joint institutions and supranational arrangements.32 
 
The European ‘Civil War’: Wartime Neutrality and Pacifism 
The significance of neutral countries for the course and outcome of the First World War has only 
recently been grasped more fully.33 They certainly posed a particular challenge to wartime 
propaganda and diplomacy, cutting across the conventional ‘us versus them’ dichotomy. Six 
European states remained neutral for the whole period, i.e. the three Scandinavian countries 
(Finland was part of the Russian empire until December 1917), Spain, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands. Together with the International Red Cross and the Vatican, they took an active role 
in humanitarian relief efforts, for instance with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war, the 
delivery of food to areas under German occupation, or the provision of medical aid and 
personnel.34 Interestingly, several neutrals attempted to form some sort of an alliance or grouping 
to coordinate their work and to protect their political and commercial rights (e.g. against the naval 
blockade), with the Scandinavian countries joining forces early on but ultimately failing to win 
over the United States and other states.35 It was in particular via these channels that the antagonistic 
powers stayed in contact with each other and effected various peace efforts (while some neutrals 
started initiatives of their own, in particular the United States and the Vatican). In early 1915, for 
instance, Berlin approached Russia about the possibility of a separate peace by way of Danish 
intermediation, and in late 1917 it asked the Spanish minister to Belgium to facilitate peace 
communications with Britain.36 Neutral countries also served as host and focal point of pacifist 
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initiatives which tried to maintain international friendship and cooperation across the frontlines. 
The Dutch Anti-War Council (Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, NAOR), a loose organisation of 
more than 10,000 members, was arguably the most significant of these. In early 1915, it helped to 
organise two international gatherings in The Hague, a large pacifist convention (leading to the 
formation of the Central Organisation for a Durable Peace) and the Women’s Peace Congress 
shortly afterwards.37 At the same time, several left-wing Socialists from both belligerent and 
neutral countries were trying to re-connect and to establish a common platform against the war 
and its underlying ‘capitalist’ causes, meeting twice in Switzerland in September 1915 
(Zimmerwald) and April 1916 (Kiental). A similar, cross-national peace conference of moderate 
Socialists was to take place in Stockholm in June 1917 but failed to materialise due to resistance 
from the Entente governments. Indeed, as the Petrograd Soviet had publicly and rather ominously 
appealed ‘to the peoples of all the world’ in March 1917: ‘The time has come to begin a decisive 
struggle against the acquisitive ambitions of the governments of all countries; the time has come 
for the peoples to take into their own hands the decision of the question of war and peace.’38 
It was also here, on neutral territory, where some of the most important and passionate 
Europeanist responses to the war were articulated. Co-founded by the Dutch writer Nico van 
Suchtelen, De Europeesche Statenbond, for instance, promoted a European federation and gained 
the support of numerous intellectuals and publicists abroad.39 It greatly influenced NAOR which 
included the demand for a united Europe in its programme. In Spain, Eugenio d’Ors lamented the 
conflict as a European ‘civil war’ and established a Committee of Friends for the Moral Unity of 
Europe, whose famous manifesto was widely translated and read.40 Numerous Swiss intellectuals, 
too, amongst them Georg Wettstein, Otfried Nippold, and Emil Rüegg, promoted European 
reconciliation and understanding.41 Johannes Erni even elaborated a constitutional draft for a 
European Union with joint institutions (including a legislative assembly) in Berne.42 Not 
surprisingly, Europeanist voices in belligerent countries were scarce in comparison. Various 
intellectuals and politicians such as Bertrand Russell and Edmund Morel, two prominent members 
of the British Union of Democratic Control, but also Charles Gide, Paul Valéry, Hellmut von 
Gerlach, René Schickele, and Benedetto Croce did defend and emphasise notions of European 
unity and commonality, but their views remained marginal in societies that were united in their 
desire to crush the enemy. Most of their peers, in fact, subscribed to the idea that the war 
represented a fundamental struggle between the ideas of 1789 and those of 1914, between German 
Kultur and Western civilisation, holding that their own side represented the genuine ideals and 
values of Europe.43 In order to escape this nationalistic atmosphere and, in some cases, political 
persecution, several literary and public figures went into exile to neutral states, most notably 
Switzerland, which offered better publishing opportunities and allowed the direct exchange with 
like-minded war critics from enemy countries. Indeed, it was in Switzerland where the German 
physician Georg Friedrich Nicolai printed his famous book on The Biology of War for which he 
was to be tried at home, only narrowly escaping to Copenhagen in summer 1918. The volume 
contained his ‘Aufruf an die Europäer’, a counter-declaration against the nationalistic manifesto 
of 93 German intellectuals of October 1914.44 Alfred Hermann Fried, the Nobel Peace Prize 
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awardee of 1911 and editor of the Friedenswarte, the leading pacifist periodical in the German 
language, had moved to Switzerland already in late 1914 in order to continue his work. He also 
published his call for the ‘Reconstruction of Europe’ here, suggesting a federation after the US-
American model to secure peace and prosperity on the Continent.45 Romain Rolland, too, who has 
been described as ‘the voice of Europe in the season of its most poignant agony’, the ‘conscience 
of the world’, resided in Switzerland from where he worked tirelessly against the war and for 
European reconciliation.46 Shunned by many of his French compatriots, he pointed to the historical 
and cultural commonalities between the belligerent nations, hoping to re-instil a European sense 
of togetherness across borders and cultures.47 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this essay was not to present a comprehensive analysis of the idea (or ideas) of Europe 
during the First World War, especially not in the sense of a more or less conventional intellectual 
history. Rather, it tried to demonstrate the persistence of elements of commonality and cooperation 
within Europe. The notion of solidarity was central in this regard, but in very different ways. In 
the first two cases, i.e. military alliances and national independence movements, a certain group 
joined forces against a concrete other, be it the military enemy or foreign domination and imperial 
rule, in order to further the state-political or ethno-national self-interest. The mutual support and 
joint efforts focused on distinct regions or parts of Europe: the Anglo-French military partnership, 
Friedrich Naumann’s Mitteleuropa, or plans to liberate the oppressed nationalities under Habsburg 
and Tsarist rule in East-Central Europe were mentioned in this context. 48 There usually was a 
possibility of extension and affiliation of further members, provided the values, interests, and aims 
of the group were shared, such as liberal democracy and the recognition of the right of national 
self-determination, but schemes and ideas of a more comprehensive continental integration 
presupposed decisive military victory over the other. Insofar, this was solidarity in practice, 
promoted primarily by statesmen, diplomats, and military leaders, although it was underpinned 
and justified by an intellectual discourse that highlighted commonalities and requested sacrifices 
for the common good, often describing the own effort as part of a mission to save or regenerate 
Europe. While notions of European identity and unity were thus also prominent in the statements 
and writings of many nationalists, they played a much more significant role for many pacifist 
thinkers and activists. Solidarity here was inherently peaceful, non-hierarchical, inclusive, and 
utopian, aimed less against a concrete other but against war and violence in general. It was based 
on moral imperatives and the fundamental respect for human rights and international justice, rather 
than on the pursuit of specific group interests and political goals. We certainly should be careful 
not to overstate the short- and long-term impact of these ideas. Altogether, Europe emerged 
weakened, impoverished, and disjointed from the chaos of war and revolution. Following the 
break-up of the Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires, and the substantial curtailment of 
German power, continental geopolitics differed considerably from the pre-war situation. The 
stipulations of the Paris Peace Treaties led to much resentment and revisionist ambitions amongst 
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the defeated (and indeed some of the victorious) powers, destabilising the new liberal-democratic 
regimes there and impeding European reconciliation for many years to come. The recognition and 
(often contested) application of the right of national self-determination quickly led to new turmoil 
and violence in the East-Central European area, although ideas of regional cooperation survived 
in the form of the ‘Little Entente’ and designs for a Danubian confederation.49 More generally, the 
two Russian revolutions – signifying the beginning of a long period of fundamental ideological 
shifts and conflicts – and the involvement of the United States had changed the parameters of the 
discourse on European unity and cooperation significantly. President Wilson promoted a global 
solution to the question of peace and stability in Europe, even though a league of nations did not 
necessarily rule out continental integration and was in fact popular with many pacifists and 
Europeanists, such as Rüegg, Nippold, and Fried.50 The Catholic and Socialist concepts of 
international solidarity, more influential again from c. mid-1917 as a consequence of the growing 
war weariness and political dissent in many belligerent countries, were in any case universal rather 
than narrowly European in principle. At the same time, Europe’s status in the world was clearly 
on the wane. While Britain and France were able to maintain and even expand their imperial rule 
(via the post-war mandate system), their empires were far from secure. Wilsonian ideals of 
internationalism and independence resonated much more with the colonial world than traditional 
claims of European moral and civilisational superiority.51 The painful experience and difficult 
legacy of the First World War, the concomitant rise of US-American and Japanese economic and 
political power, and the widespread fear of (further) European decline produced one of the most 
intense debates on continental unification and cooperation in European history, although without 
much practical relevance.52 It took another major and even more devastating military conflict 
before some of these ideas were adopted. 
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